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Abstract
The paper extends the basic Stiglitz (1982) model of optimal in-
come taxation into general search equilibrium. When we extend the
basic taxation model to include a more realistic treatment of the labor
market, a number of new interesting mechanisms arise. When wages
are ￿xed we ￿nd that a ￿work hour eﬀect￿ gives the government in-
centives to lower the marginal tax rate for both high and low skilled
workers. The optimal marginal tax on high skilled is thus negative,
and the sign for the low skilled marginal tax is ambiguous. With
wages determined by bargaining between ￿rm and worker the results
are changed. Both marginal tax rates are of ambiguous sign. The tax
systems￿ eﬀects on the wage formation and the unemployment rates
may result in new intricate redistribution channels. Simulations show
that the marginal tax rate for high skilled is increasing in the level
of redistribution when wages are ￿xed, but decreasing in the level of
redistribution when wages are determined by bargaining.
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11 Introduction
In the last 20 years there has been numerous extensions of Stiglitz (1982)
model of optimal non-linear income taxation. His basic model features two
types of workers: high skilled and low skilled. The government seeks to
￿nd the Pareto optimal set of tax/transfer regimes. The tax-function can
take on any form, and generally the tax functions solving the problem are
non diﬀerentiable. The model also features the realistic assumption that the
government cannot observe each worker￿s labor supply, only the gross labor
income is observed. This opens up for the workers to engage in ￿mimicking￿,
which restricts the government￿s possibilities to redistribute income among
the diﬀerent workers. If the government redistributes a lot of income from
the high skilled to the low skilled, the high skilled may choose to mimic the
low skilled by reducing their labor supply. If the high skilled workers earn
the same income as the low skilled workers, there is no way the government
can distinguish among the diﬀerent types.
Alongside Mirrlees (1971) groundbreaking continuous skill model, the
Stiglitz (1982) model has become be the natural choice in the study of non-
linear income taxation. Extensions have been made in many directions, such
as: heterogeneous preferences for leisure (Boadway et al, 2001), endogenous
wages (Stiglitz, 1982) and the inclusion of commodity taxation (Edwards et
al, 1994), just to mention a few. But in these studies the labor market has
typically been Walrasian; there has been no risk of unemployment in the
economy.1 In this paper we will try to combine the Stiglitz (1982) model
of optimal income taxation and the Pissarides/Mortensen search/matching
framework (Pissarides, 2000). The paper will thus extend the optimal income
tax model into a general equilibrium model with involuntary unemployment.
The Pissarides (2000) search model has been applied to a large number of
issues that relates to taxes. When dealing with tax issues in labor economics
1One exception is Aronsson and Sj￿gren (2001). They develop an optimal taxation
model with imperfect competition in the labor market, resulting from union in￿uence over
the wage formation.
2one usually speci￿es a functional form of the tax function. In this framework
one usually asks questions of positive nature, e.g.: ￿how does the income
tax aﬀect the unemployment rate?￿ (Mortensen and Pissarides, 2001) and
(Pissarides, 1998). There are however examples of normative studies as well,
e.g.: ￿What is the optimal degree of income tax progressivity?￿ (Słrensen,
1999). The normative studies however, are not concerned with equality (the
workers typically do not diﬀer ex ante) but rather with eﬃciency. The present
study does thus diverge from the existing search/matching literature in that
the workers diﬀer in ability, which makes the government concerned with
both eﬃciency and equality aspects.
When we extend the basic model of optimal income taxation to include
a more realistic treatment of the labor market, a number of new interesting
mechanisms arise. In the case with exogenous wages we ￿nd that a positive
external eﬀect from longer work hours gives the government incentive to
lower the marginal tax for both skill types. In the endogenous wage model
t h en e wm e c h a n i s m sa r em o r ei n t r i c a t e ,s i n c et h et a xs y s t e mn o wa l s oa ﬀect
the bargained wages and thereby also the unemployment rates. Perhaps the
most surprising insight is that the government now will, to some extent,
use the tax system to redistribute through the unemployment rates. Lower
risk of unemployment gives ￿ ceteris paribus ￿ higher expected utility. To
transfer utility in the form of low risk of unemployment is a very re￿ned
way to redistribute, since it does not cause any adverse behavioral eﬀects;
the potential mimicker does not enter the low skilleds￿ labor market and she
therefore cannot bene￿t from lower low skilled unemployment.
The paper is outlined as follows. In section 2 the model with exogenous
wages is presented. We derive analytical expressions for the marginal tax
rates for the set of Pareto optimal tax regimes. In a numerical exercise
we let the government￿s egalitarian preferences be determined by a strictly
concave welfare function. We can then study the optimal redistribution as
well as the optimal marginal tax rates. In section 3 the model is extended by
endogenizing the wages. The wages are determined by bargaining between
￿rms and workers. In numerical exercises we compare the results of the two
models. Section 4 concludes.
32 Exogenous Wages
2.1 The Labor Market
There are two types of workers in the economy: j = H,L,w h e r eH and L
denote high and low skill respectively. The two diﬀerent types are matched in
two separate labor markets of Pissarides/Mortensen type (Pissarides 2000).
The workers live forever and the time is continuous. At any given time a
speci￿c worker is either employed or unemployed. The workers of type j are
identical apart from being employed or unemployed. The matched jobs are
dissolved at the exogenous rate φ, equal for high and low skill.2 For both
types of workers there is a standard constant returns to scale (CRS) function
that relates the number of new matches (Mj), to the total number of eﬃcient
search hours (sjuj) and the number of vacancies (vj); i.e.,






sjuj is the measure of overall labor market tightness in the j-
type labor market, sj is the search intensity and uj denotes the number of





where sjα(θj) is the rate at which unemployed individuals ￿nd jobs. We











Since Mj is increasing in both arguments, it follows that α0
j > 0 and q0
j < 0.
We normalize the total number of workers of each type to unity and can
thus interpret uj a st h et y p es p e c i ￿c unemployment rate. In equilibrium the
total number of new matches is equal to the total number of separations, for
both types separately. This generates a ￿￿ow equilibrium￿ for each type of
2The matched jobs are dissolved according to a Poisson process with intensity φ.







The employed workers derive utility from consumption (Cj) and disutility
from market work (Lj). The unemployed workers derive disutility from search
(sj). We ignore unemployment bene￿ts, so the unemployed individuals have
no income. We let the workers￿ utility function be quasi linear in consumption
and for simplicity we normalize the marginal utility of consumption to unity.
Hence:
υ(Cj,L j)=Cj − g(Lj), (5)
if employed and
υ(0,s j)=−g(sj),( 6 )
if unemployed. For g(.) holds that g0(.) > 0 and g00(.) > 0.
The utility function is thus the same for all workers in the economy.
The linearity in consumption eliminates the incentives for smoothing the
consumption pattern over time. There is thus no incentive for saving in the
economy; we therefore make the assumption that all workers consume their
net income in every period.3 The employed worker of type j receives the
exogenously given wage wj,w i t hwH >w L.
2.2.1 The Value Functions
Let Uj be the value of being in the unemployed state for a worker of type j
and let Ej be the corresponding state value for an employed worker. With
3All the analytical results apply also for a general utility function (with the same
normality assumptions as in Stiglitz, 1982), but with a general (concave) utility function
there would be incentives to smooth the consumption over time.
5the above assumptions, the value functions for the workers take the form:
rUj = −g(sj)+sjα(θj)(Ej − Uj), (7)
rEj = Cj − g(Lj)+φ(Uj − Ej). (8)
Solving for Ej − Uj using (7) and (8) yields:
Ej − Uj =
Cj − g(Lj)+g(sj)
r + φ + sα(θj)
. (9)
2.2.2 The Employed Workers￿ Maximization Problem
Let T(Yj) be the total tax paid by a worker with gross income Yj = wjLj.
The workers￿ maximization problem then takes the following form:
max
Lj
[rEj = Yj − T(Yj) − g(Lj)+φ(Uj − Ej)].







2.2.3 The Unemployed Workers￿ Maximization Problem
The unemployed workers maximize today￿s fraction of the total state value
(rUj), w.r.t. the search intensity. To a single worker θj and Ej are exogenous,
hence the problem takes the following form:
max
sj
rUj = −g(sj)+sjα(θj)(Ej − Uj).




r + φ + sjα(θj)
,( 1 1 )
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e d( 9 ) . F r o m( 1 1 )w ec a ns o l v ef o rt h eo p t i m a ls e a r c h
intensity as a function of θj and υj ≡ Cj − g(Lj);h e n c esj(υj,θj).I t i s
6straightforward to show that
∂sj
∂υj > 0, which means that the search intensity
increases with the instantaneous utility of being employed.
2.3 The Firms
The cost of holding a vacancy is κyj,w h e r eyj is the exogenous productivity
of a worker of type j and κ is an exogenous parameter. This speci￿cf o r mo f
vacancy cost can be rationalized using a model of a large ￿rm that allocates
its workforce between production and recruitment activities; see Holmlund
(2001).
Let Jj be the total value of a ￿lled job of type j and V vac
j the total value of
a vacancy of type j. The value functions for the ￿rms can then be expressed
as:
rJ
j = Lj (yj − wj)+φ(V
vac




j = −κyj +( Jj − V
vac
j )q(θj). (13)
We assume that there is no additional cost associated with opening up a
vacancy. The value of an additional vacancy will thus be zero in equilibrium,
i.e. V vac




= Lj (yj − wj).( 1 4 )




∂Yj > 0. One interpretation of (15) is that it expresses the ￿fea-
sible￿ tightness conditional on the productivity, the wage and the parameter
κ; it gives the maximum number of vacancies that is aﬀordable, given the
workers￿ gross income. Since the wage is ￿xed, increased gross income implies
7longer work hours. Longer work hours increase the return to the ￿rm, which
thus lowers the vacancy cost per unit of ￿rm revenue. In this way there is a
positive eﬀect on the feasible tightness from longer work hours. We will refer
to this eﬀect as ￿the work hour eﬀect￿ in the subsequent analysis.
2.4 The Government
The government￿s only objective is redistribution. Hence, all the tax that is
collected is redistributed back as transfers. The government seeks to ￿nd the
set of Pareto optimal solutions to the tax problem. As noted above, we do
not consider unemployment bene￿ts; only the employed workers are exposed
to taxes and transfers.4 As in the basic Stiglitz (1982) model, we assume that
the government can only tax income; each worker￿s ability is not revealed to
the government.
In order to simplify the government￿s role we make the assumption that
the interest rate (r) approaches zero. As we will see, this means that the
government needs not to care about all four diﬀerent types/states of workers.
When r tends to zero, it turns out that today￿s fraction of the total state
value will be equal across states; the workers only diﬀer according to type,














The intuition for (16) is rather clear cut. We can think of the right hand
side as an expected value, where (1 − uj) is the probability of being em-
ployed and uj the probability of being unemployed. With no discounting
4The rationale for ignoring bene￿ts is twofold: i) It simpli￿es the model substantially
ii) There are no unemployed ￿ hence no bene￿ts ￿ in the Stiglitz (1982) model. In order
to make the analogy as complete as possible we therefore ignore bene￿ts. This equalizes
the choice set of the tax instruments in our model with the choice set in the Stiglitz (1982)
model.
8and in￿nitely lived workers, today￿s fraction of the total state value is sim-
ply a weighted average of the instantaneous utilities in the potential states.
Today￿s instantaneous utility does not enter the expression since it is of in-
￿nitesimal size compared to the total state value.5
2.4.1 The Optimal Tax Problem ￿ Pareto Eﬃcient Taxation
De￿ne today￿s fraction of the total value of being of type j according to:
Vej ≡ lim
r→0rUj =l i m







+ uj [−g(sj)].( 1 7 )
The Pareto eﬃcient tax regimes are then given by maximizing VeH w.r.t.
CH,Y H,C L and YL,s u b j e c tt oVeL = V L,w h e r eV L is the ￿promised￿ utility
(or promised fraction of total value) to the low skilled workers, plus the two
additional constraints that we discuss below.6
The self selection constraint (SSC)
Since the government￿s information set is limited, the tax function can
only be conditioned on income and not on the type of worker. The gov-
ernment does not observe each worker￿s wage or work hours separately, it
can only observe each worker￿s gross earnings. This opens up for workers to
engage in mimicking. Speci￿cally a high ability worker can pretend to be a
low ability worker, by working less in order to earn the same gross income
as a low ability worker.7 The government needs thus to ensure that the high
ability worker prefers the income that was intended for her before any other
income. One needs only consider one critical point on the gross income scale,
5Note however that when r tends to zero, it still holds that Ej >U j even though
rEj = rUj.
6When we let r approach zero and take Vej as the government￿s objective function,
t h e r ei sn on e e dt o￿ c a r e ￿f o rt h eu n e m p l o y e dw o r k e r si nt h ee c o n o m y ;i nt h eg o v e r n m e n t ￿ s
notion they are as well oﬀ as the employed. This eliminates one intuitive reason for giving
unemployment bene￿ts.
7In principle it is possible also for the low ability worker to mimic the high ability
worker. In this paper however, we choose to ignore this possibility and focus on the
￿normal￿ case, which also most of the existing literature has focused on.
9namely the income that was intended for the low ability worker. To ensure
that the high ability worker will have no incentive to engage in mimicking,




) ≥ CL − g(
YL
wH
).( 1 8 )
Since only the employed workers have the option to mimic, it is υH that
enters (18) instead of VeH(.). However, the presence of mimickers will aﬀect
the value of a job (JH) and hence the tightness (θH). This means that it
is not obvious that (18) rules out the possibility of a Nash equilibrium in
which some workers are engaging in mimicking, that is Pareto dominant to
the equilibrium with no mimicking. The critical case we need to look closer
at is when (18) holds with equality. The workers are thus indiﬀerent between
mimicking or not, on the individual level; hence every outcome, in which a
fraction α ∈ [0,1] of the workers engage in mimicking, is a Nash equilibrium.
But the presence of mimicking has general equilibrium eﬀects ￿ working
through the tightness ￿ on the workers￿ utility. VeH(.) is thus not independent
of α. However, it is straightforward to show that
dVeH(.)
dα < 0,w h i c hm e a n s
that the Nash equilibrium with no mimicking is Pareto dominating all other
equilibria. We assume in the subsequent analysis that V L is large enough to








The government’s budget restriction (GBR)
The second constraint is simply the governmentt￿s budget restriction. We
assume that the government has no other goal than redistribution, so total
consumption should equal total income in the economy.8 That is:
(1 − uH)YH +( 1− uL)YL =( 1− uH)CH +( 1− uL)CL. (20)
We can now express the government￿s problem as:













(1 − uH)YH +( 1− uL)YL =( 1 − uH)CH +( 1− uL)CL (24)
The Lagrange function for this problem is:
Ψ = VeH + ￿
£













γ [(1 − uH)YH +( 1− uL)YL − (1 − uH)CH − (1 − uL)CL],
where all shadow prices, ￿,λH and γ, are positive.
When we let the government control the workers￿ gross income and con-
sumption in this way, we implicitly assume that there exists a tax function
that renders the intended consumption decisions. For any given set of [Cj,Y j],
the eﬀective marginal tax rate is given by (10), and the total tax paid by a
worker of type j,i sYj − Cj. In general there is indeed an in￿nite number
of tax functions corresponding to each set of [CH,C L,Y H,Y L],p r o v i d e dt h a t
[CH,C L,Y H,Y L] satis￿es (20) and (18).9




=( 1 − uH)(1+λH) − (26)






9This method of solving the government￿s maximization problem follows Stiglitz (1982)
and it is described in greater detail in that paper.
11∂Ψ
∂YH


































= ￿(1 − uL) − λH (1 − uH) − (28)













































Proposition 1 The ﬁrst order conditions of the optimal tax problem imply
that T0
H < 0 and T 0
L R 0.











































wL)+g(sL) − γ (YL − CL)
·





We have now established that the marginal tax on the high ability workers
should be negative and that we can not rule out negative marginal tax on
the low income group. For a Walrasian model the corresponding result is
T 0
H =0and T 0
L > 0. The result for the high ability group stems from
the positive external eﬀect of working long hours that we described above.
Long work hours increase the tightness, since it has a positive eﬀect on the
￿rms￿ revenues; long work hours reduce the vacancy cost per work hour.
This ￿work hour eﬀect￿ is however not internalized in the employed workers￿
utility maximizing consumption choices, so the government has incentives
to use the tax instruments to encourage extended work hours. This can be
achieved by reducing the marginal taxes.
The work hour eﬀect is present also for the low ability worker, but in that
case there are other forces at work as well. In order to get a more profound
understanding of what drives the result for the low skilled, we need to take
a closer look at the basic Stiglitz (1982) model.
The result that the optimal marginal tax on high skilled is zero in the basic
Stiglitz (1982) model is not very surprising (see Stiglitz, 1987, page 1004, for
a brief rationalization of this result). But why should the marginal tax on
low skilled be positive? The answer is that increasing the marginal tax on
the low skilled is the only way the government can obtain more money from
the high skilled and redistribute to the low skilled, provided that the SSC
13binds. Think of an initial situation where the ￿promised￿ utility to the low
skilled (V L)i ss u ﬃciently large to make the SSC bind. What happens when
we increase the ￿promise￿? Without changing the low skilled￿s marginal tax,
the mimicker will then be better oﬀ than the non mimicking high skilled
worker. The only way to oﬀset this is to increase the marginal tax for the
low skilled group. Increased marginal tax on the low skilled reduces the
mimicker￿s utility more than the low skilled￿s utility. This is formally shown
in Appendix B but it is easily made plausible from an intuitive point of view.
We know that the mimicker is always better oﬀ than the low skilled worker,
since she has a higher wage. But in the limit where the marginal tax for the
low skilled individuals approaches one, neither the low skilled worker nor the
mimicker will work at all. This eliminates the utility diﬀerence between the
mimicker and the low skilled worker; there is no point in having a high wage
if you do not work. This intuitive experiment thus suggests that increasing
the low skilled￿s marginal tax has more severe eﬀects on the mimicker￿s utility
than on the low skilled￿s utility.
We can now summarize the intuition for the basic Stiglitz (1982) model as
follows. In a situation where the ￿promised￿ utility to the low skilled group
is suﬃciently low for the SSC not to bind, we have a ￿r s tb e s ts o l u t i o nw i t h
zero marginal tax for both groups. Increasing the ￿promise￿ makes the SSC
bind. By the above intuition we then need to raise the low skilled￿s marginal
tax in order to redistribute more income from the high skilled to the low
skilled, and thereby keep the ￿promise￿. The mechanism works because the
higher marginal tax hits the mimicker harder than it hits the low skilled
worker.
In our model with search frictions both of the above eﬀects are present.
We have the positive eﬀect on the low skilled￿s marginal rate stemming from
the same qualitative source as in the basic Stiglitz (1982) model. But we
also have a negative eﬀect on the low skilled￿s marginal tax stemming from
the work hour eﬀect discussed above. It is ambiguous which eﬀect that
dominates; the optimal marginal tax rate on the low ability group could be
both positive and negative.
142.5 Numerical Results
In this section we present numerical results. This gives us the possibility to
study the total redistribution rendered by the optimal tax design, as well as
the optimal marginal tax rates. The approach taken here is not to present the
whole set of Pareto optimal solutions to the tax problem; instead we choose
one single point in the Pareto set. This is done through the maximization of








eL],( 3 2 )
where χ ∈ (−∞,1) is a parameter that determines the magnitude of the
government￿s egalitarian ambition. The incentives for equality is decreasing
in χ.10





where m ∈ (0,∞) and σ ∈ (0,1) are exogenous parameters.

















The uncompensated labor supply elasticity is then given by †j = 1
ρ−1.W e
set ρ =4which gives †H = †L =1 /3.11
The parameters are chosen to roughly represent the United States econ-
omy. When calibrating the model we use a linear tax structure, instead of
the optimal non-linear one. This is because a linear tax system is probably a
better approximation of the existing tax system, than an optimal non-linear
10In the limit when χ →− ∞we get the maxi-min welfare function; it is also known
as Rawlsian welfare function. In the other limit, when χ → 1 we arrive at the utilitarian
welfare.
11This is in the middle range of the labor supply elasticities reported in the survey by
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). Simulations have been made with both higher and lower
values of †j and this does not change the qualitative results concerning the optimal tax
design and the generated outcome.
15system would be. We set the linear tax to t =0 .3 to represent a total tax
revenue at 30% of GDP.12
High skilled and low skilled are represented by collage education and
high school education ,respectively, as de￿ned in Katz and Autor (1999).
For 1990 the wage diﬀerential between these two categories are 1.65 ,a n d
the two groups can roughly be approximated to be of the same size (see
tables 8 and 12 in Katz and Autor, 1999). We therefore set yH =1 .65yL.
We set σ =0 .5 w h i c hi sh i g h e rt h a nt h ee s t i m a t e sr e p o r t e di nB l a n c h a r d
and Diamond (1989) but lower than the estimate in Pissarides (1986). We
let the separation rate be given by φ =0 .000828 which gives an annual
separation rate around 30%, when taking the day as basic time unit.13 The
wages are given by wj = δyj,w h e r eδ ∈ (0,1) is an exogenous parameter that
needs to be calibrated. δ, κ,y L and m are chosen to obtain reasonable values
of the unemployment rates (uj), the expected time of an unemployment spell
in weeks (τj) and the total cost of ￿lling a vacancy (measured in weekly labour
cost) (cj). We set δ =0 .96, κ =1 .00, m =0 .021.T h i s g i v e s uH =0 .055,
uL =0 .076, τH =8 .2, τL =9 .6, cH =7 .2 , cL =6 .1. A c c o r d i n gt oO E C D
(1997) the average unemployment rate in the United States was 6.5% for the
years 1983-1996. The duration of completed unemployment spells was 11.4
weeks during 1984-1989 (see Layard et al, 1991).14
Table 1 shows the simulation result for some diﬀerent values of χ.I n
the table, ￿S￿ stands for the presented search model, ￿Opt￿ stands for the
optimal tax design, ￿LS￿ stands for laissez faire ￿ hence the no tax solution
￿ and ￿W￿ stands for a corresponding Walrasian model with no unemploy-
ment.15 Furthermore we de￿ne the relative tax paid (or transfer received) by
aw o r k e ro ft y p ej according to Tj ≡
Yj−Cj
Yj .
12OECD (2002) reports that total tax revenues as percentage of GDP amount to 29.6%
for the United States in the year 2000.
13Layard et al (1991) report an average in￿ow rate into unemployment of 30.8% for
1984-1989.
14For the whole set of endogenous variables in the calibrated model, see appendix A.
15This is the solution that the search/matching model would generate if we let, e.g.
φ → 0 or m →∞ . It belongs to the category ￿the simplest case￿ in Stiglitz (1982).
16Table 1. Optimal tax design in search equilibrium and Walrasian equilibrium
with increasingly egalitarian preferences.
χ 0.9 0.5 -1 -100
T0
H S,opt -0.042 -0.041 -0.036 -0.008
T0
L S,opt -0.052 -0.017 0.074 0.370
TH S,opt 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.16
TL S,opt -0.24 -0.25 -0.27 -0.37
sH S,opt 0.871 0.870 0.868 0.858
sL S,opt 0.824 0.825 0.827 0.830
uH S,opt 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.047
uL S,opt 0.056 0.056 0.058 0.065
VeH
VeL S,opt 1.25 1.24 1.21 1.14
uH S,LF 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044
uL S,LF 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061
sH S,LF 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912
sL S,LF 0.767 0.767 0.767 0.767
VeH
VeL S,LF 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
T0
H W,opt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
T0
L W,opt 0.008 0.051 0.124 0.464
TH W,opt 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.17
TL W,opt -0.25 -0.26 -0.28 -0.41
VeH
VeL W,opt 1.21 1.20 1.18 1.09
VeH
VeL W,LF 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95
Parameter settings: yH =0 .825,y L =0 .5,w H =0 .792,w L =0 .48,σ =
0.5,φ =0 .000828,κ =1 ,r=0 ,m=0 .021
As expected, more egalitarian preferences give higher redistribution. But
it might seem somewhat surprising that the redistribution is quite large even
for a high value of χ. This can be explained as follows. When being in
a situation where the redistribution is so low that the SSC does not bind,
increased redistribution is very ￿cheap￿, since it can be implemented using
17diﬀerentiated lump sum tax/transfers.16 But once the SSC binds, further
redistribution becomes expensive, because it can not be attained ￿ for the
reasons described above ￿ without raising the low skilleds￿ marginal tax.17
From the simulation we see that the presence of unemployment makes it
harder to redistribute; the relative tax paid by the high skilled workers is
lower in the unemployment case than in the Walrasian case. This is not sur-
prising, since now the tax system does not only distort the employed workers￿
consumption choice, but also the unemployed workers￿ search behavior. The
individual search behavior is socially eﬃcient in the laissez faire case, so any
distortion of the workers￿ incentive to search must imply a dead weight loss.
The eﬃciency loss from higher redistribution is also captured by the
unemployment rates; higher redistribution generates higher unemployment
rates for both skill groups. Increasing the marginal tax gives shorter work
hours, which through the work hour eﬀect generates lower tightness and
higher unemployment. In the case for low skilled this is partially compen-
sated by an increased search intensity resulting from a higher value of being
employed. But for the high skilled the search intensity decreases with in-
creased redistribution, which gives an additional push to the unemployment
rate. The change in the high skilleds￿ unemployment rate is however very
small due to the quite modest increase in the marginal tax rate.
One ￿nal interesting property of the simulation result needs to be com-
mented on. Why does the optimal tax design consist of a higher high skilled
marginal tax for low values of χ than for high values of χ?T h i se ﬀect stems
16From a strictly technical point of view one might argue that diﬀerentiated lump sum
tax/transfer is not a feasible tax instrument, at the given information set. But any tax
structure that implies zero marginal tax at both types optimal income choice, has in
practice the exact same implication as a diﬀerentiated lump sum tax/transfer. It is in this
sense we will use the concept ￿lump sum tax/transfer￿ in the subsequent text.
17This intuitive argument seem to assume that the welfare function always gives us
incentive to redistribute enough to make the SSC bind. This is true in the basic Stiglitz
model for any concave welfare function and separable utility functions; see Arnott, Hosios
and Stiglitz (1988). But in our model with unemployment this needs to be checked for
every choice of χ. It turns out that for all the cases presented in the table the SSC does
bind. This is also true for the numerical exercise in section 3.
18from the fact that the high skilled workers have longer work hours than they
would choose in laissez faire equilibrium. This means that raising the mar-
ginal tax on high skilled workers gives them higher instantaneous utility, if
the total tax paid is held constant.18 In order to redistribute more to the low
skilled individuals, the government thus needs to raise the marginal tax on
high skilled and thereby make the non mimicking worker better oﬀ.
3 Endogenous Wages
We now turn to an extension of the model presented in the previous section.
So far wages have been ￿xed. In this section we will allow for the wages
to be determined endogenously. The most frequent practice, in this class of
labor market models, is to let the wages be determined by generalized Nash
bargaining (see e.g. Pissarides, 2000).
3.1 The Model
The model is identical to the one presented above, apart from the wage deter-
mination. When a ￿rm and a worker are matched they bargain over wages.
While bargaining, both parts recognize the tax function T(wL); the tax func-
tion is exogenous to both parts in the bargaining process. The generalized











where the sub index i indicates the speci￿c match i.e. only Eji and Jji are
functions of wji. β ∈ (0,1) is a measure of the workers￿ bargaining power.
18If the functional form of T(Y ) was speci￿ed, we would not be able to think of T0 and
T as unrelated, since T0 and T then would then be linked. But since the tax function can
take on any shape, we can treat T0 and T as parameters. A change in T 0 is assumed to be
made with a corresponding change in the whole tax function, leaving T unaﬀected, and
vice versa. In the subsequent text we will treat T0 and T as distinct parameters.
19The ￿rst order condition of (33) is given by:1920
















Lj is the labor supply elasticity. By making use of (9), (13)
and the free entry condition we can derive the following wage equation from
(34):
Cj − g(Lj)+g(sj)
















.( 3 5 )
The full equilibrium ￿ in the θj, sj and wj space ￿ is determined by the
wage equation above, the ￿rst order condition for search (11) and the tight-
ness equation resulting from the free entry condition (14). The comparative
static properties of this system of equations are ambiguous; it is unclear how
a marginal increase in e.g. T 0
j aﬀects the endogenous variables in equilib-
rium. There are diﬀerent mechanisms working in opposite directions. We
know that the ￿work hour eﬀect￿ indicates a positive relation between T 0
j
and uj, but this may now be oﬀset by a new wage eﬀect working through
the bargaining. However, in the toy-model described below we will work out
some useful comparative static properties of a special case of the model de-
scribed above. This will serve as an illustration of one particular mechanism;
it will emphasize the ￿new￿ eﬀect that the tax system has on the equilibrium
unemployment rate and bargained wages. The ￿old￿ eﬀect is the work hour
eﬀect: a lower marginal tax, gives longer work hours, which lowers the va-
cancy cost per work hour. The work hour eﬀect is present in the endogenous
wage model as well. But now there is an additional eﬀect at work, and as we
will see, this new eﬀect counteracts the work hour eﬀect in some aspects.
19After the derivation we have imposed symmetry and thereby eliminated the subindex
i.
20We have here made the assumption that the tax function is locally linear, hence
T00
j =0 .
203.1.1 A Toy-Model ￿ Exogenous Labor Supply
The toy-model is a one-type version of the above endogenous wage model.21
Furthermore we make the assumption that the labor supply and the search
intensity are ￿xed: L = L and s = s.22 The equations that describe the

















,( 3 7 )
where (36) is the free entry condition, and (37) is the bargained wages.





.( 3 8 )
We will now analyze the comparative statics of this model with respect
to T0 and T. Starting with T 0 we can derive:
dw
dT 0 < 0,( 3 9 )
dθ
dT 0 > 0 and (40)
du
dT 0 < 0.( 4 1 )
Raising the marginal tax makes it more costly to give the workers￿ utility
in the form of high wage. The ￿rms will therefore seize a larger part of the
21 In this model we do not focus on the optimal tax design; we focus purely on the
comparative static properties. These properties are easily illustrated in a model with
homogenous workers, so we do not need a second type of skill. This means that we drop
the sub index j and θj becomes θ etc.
22This assumption eliminates what we have called the ￿work hour eﬀect￿, since the labor
supply is now unaﬀected by changes in the marginal tax.
21￿cake￿ in the wage bargaining. Lower wage raises tightness, which through
the ￿ow equilibrium gives lower unemployment. This result is consistent with
Słrensen (1999) and Hansen (1999) who ￿nd, in closely related models, that
increased tax progressivity gives lower unemployment.






< 0 and (43)
du
dT
> 0.( 4 4 )
A worker who is exposed to a lump sum tax will thus partially be com-
pensated for this through a rise in the bargained wage. The increase in the
bargained wage lowers the feasible tightness, which raises unemployment.
3.2 Numerical Results
We now return to the full model with endogenous labor supply and search
intensity, keeping the results from the toy-model in mind. Since the model
is rather complex, we do not derive any analytical results concerning the
optimal tax design. Instead we present some numerical simulations. The
simulations are made with the same welfare function and the same para-
meter settings as for the exogenous wage model (see table 1). We consider
the symmetric case β =0 .5, i.e. the worker and the ￿rm share the same
bargaining power. The results are presented in table 2.
22Table 2. Optimal tax design in search equilibrium with increasingly egalitarian
preferences.
χ 0.9 0.5 -1 -100
T0
H S,opt -0.027 -0.029 -0.034 -0.072
T0
L S,opt -0.060 -0.027 0.061 0.415
TH S,opt 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.18
TL S,opt -0.25 -0.26 -0.28 -0.44
sH S,opt 0.869 0.868 0.865 0.850
sL S,opt 0.826 0.827 0.830 0.835
uH S,opt 0.049 0.049 0.050 0.053
uL S,opt 0.045 0.044 0.042 0.033
wH S,opt 0.795 0.795 0.795 0.797
wL S,opt 0.475 0.474 0.472 0.457
VeH
VeL S,opt 1.23 1.22 1.18 1.07
sH FM 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912
sL FM 0.767 0.767 0.767 0.767
uH FM 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043
uL FM 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052
wH FM 0.792 0.795 0.795 0.795
wH FM 0.476 0.476 0.476 0.476
VeH
VeL FM 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99
Parameter settings: β =0 .5 other parameters as in table 1.
In contrast to the exogenous wage model, the optimal marginal tax on
high skilled is now increasing in the egalitarian preference parameter χ;i n -
creased preference for equality gives lower optimal marginal tax on the high
skilled. This is the most striking diﬀerence of the optimal tax structure
in the endogenous wage model relative to the exogenous wage model. For
low skilled, however, the optimal tax structure follows the same qualitative
pattern in both models.
When looking at the total tax transfers we see that the redistribution from
high skilled to low skilled is higher in the present model than in the previous.
23Endogenizing the wages thus makes it easier to redistribute from high to low
skilled. This is also captured by the utility ratio
VeH
VeL ;t h er a t i oi s￿a tag i v e n
value of χ ￿ lower in the present model. The redistribution from high skilled
to low skilled is not fully assessed by only looking at the tax system itself.
This is since some of the redistribution works through the unemployment
rates. We see that the tax system raises the high skilled￿s unemployment
and lowers the low skilled￿s unemployment; the unemployment rate for the
high skilled is actually higher than the unemployment for the low skilled for
all values of χ.
3.3 Intuitive Discussion of the Results
First of all, we know from (42) that the redistribution in itself (think of a
lump sum tax/transfer from high to low skilled) raises the high skilled￿s wage
and lowers the low skilled￿s wage. The eﬀect of this is higher unemployment
for high skilled and lower for low skilled. Even at χ =0 .9 the redistribution
is substantial, but the government has no problem making the SSC hold.
This means that the government can use the marginal tax instrument to
reach eﬃciency, rather than keeping the high skilled workers from mimicking.
The marginal tax instruments are therefore used to correct for some of the
wage adjustments caused by the redistribution. The optimal high skilled
marginal tax is relatively high, which restrains the wage increase, and the
optimal low skilled marginal tax is relatively low, which restrains the wage
decrease.23 When χ decreases the SSC becomes increasingly important. As
in the previous ￿xed wage model, the government reacts to this by increasing
the marginal tax on low skilled. But the eﬀect this has on the SSC is now
twofold. As in the ￿xed wage model it has a larger negative labor supply
eﬀect on the mimicker than on the low skilled worker. This means that the
mimicker is hit harder by the increase in the marginal tax rate, than the
23The marginal tax on the high skilled is negative for all values of χ in table 2. This
however is not a general result. It may well be that the marginal tax for the high skilled
is positive for some other set of parameters.
24low skilled worker is.24 However, raising the marginal tax for the low skilled
now also aﬀect the bargained wages. If we believe that the toy-model eﬀect
dominates, this implies a decrease in the bargained wages, which we also can
observe in table 2. At a ￿rst glance this may seem as something that would
be bad for the low skilled and therefore would give the government problems
to increase the redistribution. But surprisingly and interestingly, it is exactly
the opposite way around; this wage eﬀect makes it easier to redistribute in
the endogenous wage model. The reason is that the decrease in the wage is
partially redistributed back to the low skilled workers in the form of lower
unemployment, which is something that the mimicker does not bene￿tf r o m .
Hence both the mimicker and the low skilled worker suﬀer from the wage
decrease ￿ the mimicker suﬀers because the wage decrease lowers his/her
labor supply ￿ but only the low skilled worker bene￿ts from the induced fall
in the unemployment rate. The government can therefore use the marginal
tax instrument to perform a very intricate form of redistribution through the
low skilled unemployment rate. The higher the preference for equality is, the
more the unemployment rate is used as a tool for redistribution.
For the high skilled group, the marginal tax is decreased, which contrasts
the result from the previous model. The reason is ￿ as in the ￿xed wage model
￿ that the government needs to make the non mimicking workers better oﬀ,
in order to redistribute more to the low skilled workers. But when the wages
are determined by bargaining, the non mimicking worker￿s instantaneous
utility is no longer increasing in the marginal tax.25 Instead ￿ as the toy
model suggests ￿ lower marginal tax for high skilled workers raises the wage
and thereby the instantaneous utility.26 However, the previous eﬀect ￿ that
24See the intuitive discussion of the numerical results for the exogenous wage model.
25As before we here consider the total tax paid by the high skilled worker as ￿xed; hence
the change in the marginal tax rate is compensated by alteration of the total tax function,
in a way that keeps the total tax paid constant.
26This intuitive explanation is a little hazy. What matters in the SSC is not only the
instantaneous utility of the high skilled worker in itself, but rather the diﬀerence between
the mimicker￿s utility and the non mimicker￿s utility. An eﬀect working through the wage
does thus aﬀect both the mimicker and the non mimicking worker, which makes the eﬀect
on the SSC ambiguous. However, it is straight forward to show that a rise in the high
25increased work hours lowers the instantaneous utility for high skilled workers
￿ is still there, but the simulation suggests that the eﬀect of increased wage
is larger.
The unemployment rate for the high skilled can be explained analogously.
If this new wage eﬀect on unemployment (the toy model eﬀect) outweighs
the work hour eﬀect, a decrease in the marginal tax rate would give higher
unemployment instead of lower. As we see in table 2, lower marginal tax is
accompanied by higher unemployment, which indicates that the wage eﬀect
does indeed outweigh the work hour eﬀect. Lower marginal tax on high
skilled thus raises the high skilled￿s wage, lowers the tightness and increases
the unemployment rate.
4 Concluding Remarks
The paper has extended the basic Stiglitz (1982) model of optimal income
taxation into general search equilibrium. In the model with ￿xed wages we
￿nd that the ￿work hour eﬀect￿ gives the government incentives to lower
the marginal tax rate for both high and low skilled workers. The result
from the basic Stiglitz (1982) model ￿ zero marginal tax on high skilled and
positive marginal tax on low skilled ￿ is modi￿ed to negative marginal tax
on high skilled and ambiguous sign for low skilled, in the exogenous wage
model. From simulations we ￿nd that the optimal marginal tax on high
skilled depends positively on the level of redistribution. The reason for this
is that raising the marginal tax on high skilled workers gives them higher
instantaneous utility, if the total tax paid is held constant. In order to
redistribute more to the low skilled individuals, the government thus needs
to raise the marginal tax on high skilled and thereby make the non mimicking
worker better oﬀ.
When the wages are determined endogenously by bargaining between the
￿rm and the worker, simulations show that the results for high skilled are
skilled wage has a larger positive eﬀect on the non mimicking worker￿s utility than it has
o nt h em i m i c k e r ￿ s .T h ew a g ee ﬀect from lowering the high skilled￿s marginal tax does thus
also make the non mimicking worker better of relative to the mimicker.
26dramatically changed. We can no longer rule out positive marginal tax on
high skilled and the optimal marginal tax on high skilled now depends nega-
tively on the level of redistribution. The reason for this is that the bargained
wage may depend negatively on the marginal tax. In order to increase the
instantaneous utility of the non mimicking worker the government needs also
to take this new wage eﬀect into consideration.
Endogenizing the wages opens up for the government to perform redis-
tribution through the unemployment rate. Raising the marginal tax on low
skilled has ￿ at least in the numerical examples we have looked at ￿ a negative
eﬀect on the low skilleds￿ unemployment rate. Giving the low skilled workers
utility in the form of low unemployment is a very elegant way to redistribute,
since the mimicker does not bene￿t from a decrease in unemployment for low
skilled.
When looking at the optimal redistribution we ￿nd that the presence of
unemployment makes it harder for the government to redistribute from high
to low skilled. This result holds for both the exogenous wage model and the
endogenous wage model, but there is least redistribution in the exogenous
wage model.
In future work it would be interesting to explore the optimal tax transfer
regime when the government utilizes the full information set. This means
that the government would not only set an optimal non-linear tax function,
but also an optimal non-linear unemployment bene￿t function. The bene￿ts
would thus be a function of the income. When the ￿rm and the worker meet
to bargain over the wage, they will recognize that the future value of being
unemployed depends on the bargained wage. This may give the government
a powerful instrument to monitor the wage formation.
27Appendix A
Table 2. Calibrated model, linear tax t =0 .3.
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